Living Under the Islamic Umbrella: 1969 and 1976

Introduction

“To know Malaysia is to love Malaysia” was a popular ditty composed for the tourism agency of Malaysia in the 1980s. And as I travel to other parts of the world, I realize this ditty speaks something to us Malaysians as well, namely that we Malaysians are a bundled contradiction in our ways. Take for example our races, it would be unfair to call anyone in Malaysia a racist, but they have strong communal feelings but just the same are open to fall in love and marry someone of a completely different cultural heritage. Many would profusely extol their own traditional cuisine, but would not let a day or two go past in a week without something of other dishes on their dinner table. Politicians aside, they are generally passionate about their languages but insist Malay and English are a must for their children. There is a reason, a good one, for this cultural state of affairs, this often strange multi-ethnocentrism, this insistence on being ethnocentrism that seems meaningful only with the backdrop of pluralism. The emergent society is continually inventing itself. It is something for me to watch.

Today is the result of a vast and continuous migration of people living around the Indian Ocean and eastern part of the Pacific Ocean for thousands of years. Seafarers, traders, farmers, adventurers, nobles, and labourers have come here and made possible an interchange of goods, species, diseases, and most importantly ideas. This vast emporium stretches from Zanzibar to Japan, and Malaysia is just one pearl in that string. It is a history that is slowly being unravelled only in this century. When people become settled they form rigidly stratified social classes traders and adventurers find new possibilities here, farmers and labourers find freedom from oppression, and nobles can escape from opprobrium in their own kingdoms. This is the first and fundamental cultural overlay. And it is upon this overlay we find every other cultural multifarious features of the people. And it is for this reason Islam finds a welcome home in this region, and especially so for those features of Islam that is universalising. This cultural flux like the monsoon creates contradictions that first bewilders its migrants who will eventually succumb to its seasons. 

Modern Peninsular Malaysia lies in the centre of this paradigm represented by the Southeast Asian land mass. It is surrounded by the archipelago that is a very large Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines. Historically, the nation is the crossroad of the monsoon trade winds that brought people (i.e. their genetics, religion, culture and politics) from India, China, Arabia, and Europe to our shores. The Malay world, called the Nusantara (pronounced noo-sun-thrah) has always responded to the cultural and political development of these great centres of civilisations. It would not be surprising to find, the somewhat charming admixture of language, manners, music, cuisines, costumes, art, architecture, religions, races, and politics due to this singular geographical fact. Translated into homes, street and pasar - it is full of delightful tales, colour, smell, and sound.

Modern Malaysia is an economic powerhouse of sorts – a little tiger. The land is fertile, rich in minerals and somewhat underpopulated. Since the sleepy days of Independence the leaders of the nation, corruption aside, had somewhat steadily brought the economic dividends to the people. Access to social amenities, better social infrastructures, and an increasingly open system of government has all tended towards a people who are better-fed, living longer with better health-care, better educated, better informed, and perhaps even better entertained. As with each generation of the recent past, we actually take these for granted.

Malaysians are also very religious. Some say there is no street in Malaysia that you can turn into and not find a shrine, temple, church or mosque. One can look at a car and could almost always determine the religion of the owner, if not the racial origin. Fridays and Sundays were holy days even before any legislation. The citizens enjoy 14 national public holidays. And this does not take into account the numerous religious festivals undertaken without any declarations of public holidays. Twice yearly, during Chinese New Year and Eid Al-fitr or "Hari Raya Puasa" as it is called here, the whole country goes through a week-long seizure when everyone irrespective of religion makes an excuse to balik kampong, that is to go back to home town or village to be with folks and friends, and perhaps take in the change of scenery for good measure. In large companies and government services, employees of different religious background helps in deciding who gets to take leave – often in a cheerful sort of way.


It is upon this canvas that Christianity brings its own hue and colour. The arrival of Diogo Lopes de Sequeira  in 1509 marks that advent. Locally it was the arrival of Christianity and unfortunately it also marked the eastern extension of the Christian-Muslim conflict called the Crusades. This history is not forgotten. Never mind that the arrival of a Christian rival power goaded the Arab traders and Islamized local suzerains to spread Islam over the rest of Southeast Asia but the Islamic narrative that Christianity is "foreign" and is "enemy" persists whose presence is at best tolerated. And the transformation of Christian traders into a colonial force did not help the cause of the Cross. 

That may sound like a long time ago but what has not changed since 1509 is that the Christian-Muslim relations has always been a question of Malay relations with non-Malays who share their political and economic space. And the Malay rulers understood the legitimising power of Islam to their status as rulers if they portray themselves as its champion. As a result the portrayal of a loyal Malay as one who is a Muslim became very quickly developed into a social norm. Masuk Melayu became synonymous with becoming a Muslim - this is a concept that took hold even in the 16th century. So to the Malay today inter-religious relations is no different from race relations, and this paper is written with that perspective in mind.

What is 1969?

1969 is a critical year in the psyche of Malaysians as well as the watershed year for the development of modern Malaysian politics. Modern Malaysians experienced a racial riot at a national level. To understand the changes that this precipitated, it must be affirmed that the 1969 Riot itself was a horrifying descend into carnage that we do not want to visit again. It was disturbing to our parents then, and it is disturbing to us today. As we begin to understand the inter-generational dynamics behind communal violence, it is also very disturbing for the present generation. A vast majority of people in Malaysia would not put up a hand if they were asked to affirm that there would be no communal violence in the lifetime of their children. It remains a dark shadow over the soul of the nation.

In the aftermath, leading communal politicians pleaded for peace and calm but Malay politicians, particularly UMNO leaders competed with one another to present a viable narrative. It is to their sagacity that they took a doctrinal stand that the violence was caused by economic imbalance primarily and the dangerous racial undertones were incidentals. It is my opinion that we have Tun Dr Ismail Abdullah, then Deputy Prime Minister to Tun Abdul Razak Hussein. This they believed could and should be corrected by education and an economic system that can ensure a better distribution of wealth. There has been much grumbling and finger wrangling since then, but whether such policies have been successful continues to be debated but there were no better alternatives.

Prior to 1969, the preoccupation of politics was whether the Malays have the right to political ascendancy. The formation of the Malayan Union in 1946 had technically transferred sovereignty of the Malay Rulers to the British Crown and it did not sit well with the Malays - elites, intellectuals, ulamas and the common man. The Crown promised to return power to a liberal democracy was equally foreboding since the timely publication of the 1921 Census showed that the non-Malays outnumbered the Malays!

A whole lot politicking and negotiations took place as to who represents whose interest best. To be fair to the British, they favoured a returning of power to the Malays on a basis that can be seen as licit in the eyes of the world. For very many understandable reasons the British at this time concerned themselves very much to be perceived as great statesmen. 

In Malaya the existing political leaders were either sympathetic to Communist ideals, or were antagonistic to British conduct before and during the war, or were tainted by their collaboration with the now defeated Japanese occupiers. In any case, their diplomacy led to the grooming of a clutch of brand new local leaders whose legitimacy was partly established by force and intrigue. Mainly it was made clear in the negotiations that the traditional rights of the Malay Rulers must be guaranteed; and Islam protected by a Malay leadership legitimised by it being Muslim and determined by democracy. This is not liberal democracy but conditional democracy that takes into account heritage rights. It was very unlike the sort of democracy that were realised in other former British Colonies. It was with this understanding that the British paved the way for the Independence of Malaya. Once agreed, anyone against it can fall foul of seditious crime, or treason. This is the first social doctrine of Malaysia.

The Malthusian realities of the 1921 Census did not dissipate so easily. A large segment of the Chinese community felt that they can either form the government by force the means for which they thought they had. Intra-communal differences also showed that certain segments of the community felt the right approach should be the ballot box. That is the background to the People’s Action Party. They thought they had the legitimate means to overcome the First Social Doctrine. The 1969 Election brought that possibility dangerously close to reality. This brought out the the right wing factions of the Malay community. At a very basic level, this was the culmination of old racial attitudes of the Malays and the Chinese. [1] The epicentre of the violence was the capitol city of Kuala Lumpur but groundswell of anger initiated much copycat violence elsewhere. In the end 1,009 were arrested for rioting; 180 were injured; 196 died; 45 convicted for arson or murder; 39 went missing, and many millions of ringgit were lost in damages. [2] As to be expected, the toll on life and property is believed to be far worse than that were officially admitted.

1969 is an important departure point in the history of Malaysia because it created the necessary conditions for a political will across the communal spectrum to forge an important social contract – the native-first affirmation policy, or simply the Bumiputra Policy. The Malay leadership resolutely refused to consider the racial riot as a challenge to Malay rights although all evidences point to this. Kudos to them. The consequences of a racially motivated interpretation of history would have had dire consequences for all Malaysians. Instead wisdom ruled the day and this must be acknowledged. The leaders deemed that the underlying reason for the 1969 Racial Riot was economic disparity among the various communities in the nation; and the racial boundaries of the economic disparity was the bogeyman British and their legacy of “divide-and-rule”. The fact remains that Malay poverty or for that matter, any one community in poverty, will be a destabilising factor in any society. And as a result there was no open retribution; and all criminal activities that took place during the Riot were considered simply that: crime committed by miscreants. Contrary to public opinion, many of the Malay right wing extremists involved in the riot were punished quietly and politically. It would be too harsh to say that 1969 poisoned the national spirit but, it certainly gave it a hue.

This economic interpretation of 1969, upheld by an ideal of racial harmony that all Malaysians can strive for, led to the establishment of a policy of re-distribution of the wealth of the nation to balance the differences that ran along racial boundaries. This political doctrine took the shape of the New Economic Policy. In 1971, the Economic Planning Unit was established in the Prime Minister’s Department to study and monitor all legislation for compliance to this policy. These policies had tended towards:

a.  strengthening Malay political status quo as the predominant power;

b.  contingent upon Malay power, the concentration of the nation’s capital and economic resources into the hands of the Malays vis-à-vis the Government; and

c.  entrenching Islam as the bulwark and gateway for Malay identity and culture, and hence an Islamic stake in the political and economic future of the country.

It would not be far fetched to say that any matters of importance in public debate is centred around these three inter-related issues. [3] I call this three-pronged premise, the “Malay Agenda” that defines and colours all Christian-Muslim relations - Malays are Muslims by definition, and Christians are with rare exceptions non-Malays. Christian-Muslim relations is indeed a inter-religious relationship but just as much a inter-racial relationship. The factors that affect the racial equation, affects the religious relations.

Christian-Muslim Relations and Race Relations in General

As a result, the Malays entered the post-1969 era with a sense of deep grievance of economic marginalisation, and at the leadership level, with a quite confidence to fix this problem. The Malays felt that they have gone down a politically precarious road by accommodating the predominantly non-Muslim / non-Malays in the first place. The Malays had given up or suspended the ideal of a Malay nation or an Islamic nation, in order to become a Malay community within a plural nation. This was indeed an honourable concession but one that significant segments of the Malay community consider as not reflective of the consensus but something kept in check by the Malay leaders. In my opinion this lies heavily in the conscience of the average Malay and tinges their relationship with other races and people of other faiths even today.[4]

And in the principle of accommodation, Malay national politics and the policies they espoused, the Malay leadership narratives sought to protect and strengthen Malay communal solidarity and economic standing in Malaysia. Islam was used as just the right tool. Interestingly, Muslim thinkers such as Chandra Muzaffar believe Islam is the basis of Malay political tolerance, and one that does certainly inform the Muslim-Christian relations in Malaysia by keeping racism out of it.[5] While Dr Muzaffar’s argument may hold true in certain learned quarters of the Malay community, it is not as universal as he claims nor are the Malays, to use the euphemism of the scholar Judith Nagata, wearing just one hat.[6]

It may also be argued that in the context of Malaysia, Islam and Malayness cannot be separated, and the greatest proponent of this argument is the former premier, and also the present premier Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. The Federal Constitution defines a Malay as a Muslim, and this notion has been reinforced both politically and culturally right through the Malay community. Indeed Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad had reiterated publicly that as a matter of fact there is no place in Malaysia for Malays who convert to other faiths. In fact, in the Government Census prior to 1991, there was no acknowledgement of Malay Christians.[7] It can be stated that the nationalist spirit of the Malay community is animated by Islam, and culturally no discussion of one can be separated from the other.

Demographic Changes in Christian-Muslim Relations

In 1991, Christians comprised 7.9% of the Malaysian population, and it rose to 9.1% in 2000. This represents an increase of 653,000 Christians over a ten-year period. When the national average birth rate 2.92% per year for the period, and a negligible immigration is discounted for, the balance may be considered as indicative of conversion. And indeed the largest representative of Christian growth is found among the Dayaks of East Malaysian, and the Chinese in West Malaysia, each representing about 14.3% growth rate and 2.0% growth rate respectively. In the 2010 Census the statistics indicated that 44.2% of Sarawak and 31.5% of Sabah are Christian, compared to 30.2% Muslims in Sarawak and 58.0% in Sabah. From the Malay/Muslim point of view this is cause for serious alarm for two very important reasons.[8]

Firstly, the Dayaks in East Malaysia are considered Bumiputras which technically gives them access to large amount of Government largess reserved for Muslim Malays, i.e. the “Melayu”. Taking into account that the Malacca Portuguese, the Kedah Thais, and the majority of the Orang Asli are not Muslims but are classified as Bumiputra, it ever so slightly challenges the status quo of Malay as a Muslim who rely on the much contested rights of ascendancy of Malays to assert control of the politics of the nation. Having a large minority of Christians in the Bumiputra group upsets the status quo of Muslim / Malay control of national resources. Secondly, the Chinese already have a large stake in the national economics and are considered the inevitable affected party in the drive for Malay economic dominance in the nation. The increasing number of Christians among the Chinese will inevitably shape the Muslim-Christian relations, and can even translate into voting behaviour, and challenge the Social Doctrine.

Muslim Augmentation of the Social Contract and Article 12 of the Constitution

In order to understand the hue of Christian-Muslim Relations in Malaysia since the fateful 1969, one has to understand how the Malay-Muslims are contesting the “social contract” enshrined in the Federal Constitution.[9] I have highlighted three areas for sympathetic consideration.

Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad declared in 2001 at the Parti Gerakan’s 30th National Delegates Conference that “UMNO wishes to state loudly that Malaysia is an Islamic country. This is based on the opinion of ulamaks who had clarified what constituted as Islamic country.” This bold statement caught many by surprise but the credit for the Islamisation of the country does not belong to Tun Dr. Mahathir - it must go to a leader who was considered, somewhat unfairly, as a “soft leader” during his time, the then Datuk, Hussein bin Onn.

Tun Hussein Onn was a punctilious lawyer who considered his primary task as Prime Minister was to see to the implementation of the New Economic Policy – his predecessor Tun Abdul Razak’s brainchild. Nonetheless, he introduced an innovation that had far reaching implication. He abrogated another social doctrine of a liberal democracy - the separation of state and religion. He concretised our First Social Doctrine when he despite his personal illness adroitly steered the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1976 (Act A354) to provide for the amendment of Article 12 of the Federal Constitution. Section 6 of the Act was amended by substituting Clause (2) with the following new clause:

“Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such institutions or in the administration of any such law; but it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.”

Hussein Onn must have been very fearful indeed when he not only explained that “the religious needs of the people are legitimate concerns of the Government” but went on to remind the nation that this matter affecting Islam is further protected by Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 (Act A30) that prohibits debate, of any matter related to Malay rights, status, positions, privileges, sovereignty or prerogatives established in Article 152, 153 and 181, enshrined as law in Section 3(1) of The Sedition Act. And indeed he did send six prominent politicians to Kamunting, and created a masterly executed highly theatrical controversy by enacting laws for a 67-day (one week plus 60 days) detention for offences that need not be specified.[10] This Executive power was withdrawn subsequently but it was a good enough to divert public opinion from the realisation that that was the day secularism in Malaysia actually died.

The constitutional amendment of Article 12 is the enabler for the legitimate release of Federal funds for Islamic education, mosques, dakwah, development of Islamic human resources and financial institutions. In effect this allowed the setting up of the entire bureaucratic infrastructure of Islamic governance in Malaysia.

This push to move away from the doctrine of separation of state and religion may be attributed to the rise of a new Muslim professionals of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) under the leadership of (the now Datuk Seri) Anwar Ibrahim but that is another story.[11] ABIM holds this change in the Constitution as a cherished accomplishment of their movement. Other push-factors were there: for one, Parti Sa-Islam Malaysia (PAS) which was a Barisan component party wanted to break away on the grounds that UMNO lacked the commitment to the establishment of an Islamic state. This was very distressing since the breakaway meant a fracture within the Malay racial solidarity in national politics. So the Government needed funds urgently to support Islamic works to counter the influence of PAS, and none could be released from the Treasury. The solution as Hussein Onn saw it was to set aside the idea of a secular state, which was un-Islamic in the first place, and so in 1976, he laid the foundation for the Islamisation of Malaysia. Interestingly, having fulfilled his goal Tun Hussein Onn and later his successor, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, moved towards the neutralization of ABIM as a political force. Its leader Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO and all the rights and privileges of ABIM were withdrawn short of banning the society.

By 1976, the New Economic Policy and its implementing organ, the Economic Planning Unit, were firmly in place. It was considered a politically legitimate re-definition of the “Independence social contract”. After 1976, the Government bureaucracy was gradually Islamized, and silently the pre-Merdeka commitment to a secular state was abandoned in favour of, not a theocracy built on shariah but an Islamic nation led by Muslims, ergo Malays. This in essence is the outworking of the “Malay Agenda” as the new paradigm for Christian-Muslim relations. And the definition of Islam in the Constitution as the “official religion” of the State in effect became the state religion of Malaysia. As a result Christians and the Church were no more dealing with another faith-community called Muslims but were dealing with a political entity called state-Islam.

Christian Response to the Amendment of Article 12

After the 1969 Riots, the lower house of the Parliament was suspended. When Parliamentary rule resumed in 1971, the issue of internal security due to racial antagonism and external security issues that stoked racial antagonism existed. The 1976 amendment to Article 12 of the Federal Constitution took place after the 3rd election in 1974. It was also a period when the non-Malay leaders were bogged down with their survival in their own parties - no one would have been in any mood for debates on any matters that still strike many as abstruse jurisprudence. The media was focused on Communist terrorist violence that was spilling into Malaysia. There was very little public or Parliamentary debate over Article 12 partly because the Amendment process was bundled up with 48 other amendments correcting typos in the Constitution, and was tabled and passed in toto. But in the end, it could be said that the non-Malay political leaders were not concerned with Article 12 or in fact, may have seen the amendment as beneficial from an economic point of view. The fact it contradicts Article 11 blatantly was never and had never been a point of political contention!

Among the Muslim thinkers there was the vociferous rabble-rouser the young Anwar Ibrahim whose base of supporters came from Universiti Malaya, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and his grassroots connection in Kedah. His gains were consolidated by the then Deputy Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohmad who increasingly ran Government for Tun Hussein Onn who was ailing and had to underwent a coronary bypass in 1981. He resigned thereafter and Tun Dr Mahathir became the Prime Minister. He moved aggressively to concentrate Executive power at the expense of the other branches of the Government and this became his signature style of governance. It became the doctoral thesis of his famous critique Dr Rais Yatim who is presently the Culture and Arts Minister.[12] That is yet another story but Malaysian scholars continue to pin Islamization on Dr Mahathir as if he was the engineer responsible for it, and to my thinking, he is happy to leave it at that as well.

Muslim intellectuals suddenly had found political support and whose occasional anti-Christian diatribes sometimes found its way into public media . This caused great consternation among Christian leaders who were often desirous of establishing good relations with the Government. At the intellectual level the stand-offish debate was dominated by Dr. Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas whose powerful presence and criticism of the church as a remnant of colonialism and considered a secular Malaysia as a victim of Westernization and a deviation from the purity of the Islamic state.[13] He accused the Church of being unfit to be dialogue partners - a notion well justified by their Scripture - and this attitude is still prevalent both in Islamic institutions as well in Government bodies.

On the side of Christians the most prominent thinker was Dr Batumalai whose idea that he termed “neighbourology”- it was a call to Churches to take Islam a lot more seriously. He together with the Catholic Bishops was deeply concerned that the Churches have been shut out of any sort of dialogue with the Government. Dr Batumalai’s rambling book A Prophetic Christology for Neighbourology: A Theology for Prophetic Living[14] was the most significant book by a Christian thinker to be published during this time. It appeared in 1986 but unfortunately none of his works reckons the death of secularism in 1976. However, he correctly understood Islam as no more a religion of conscience but was the Government itself. And his reliance on newspapers and media reporting indicates the extent of how much the public and non-state sponsored researchers were cut off from accessing source material.

In any case, church leaders were pre-occupied bickering over matters related to church union; and intensely squabbling over problems of succession of leadership. Those denominations that were not, the Lutheran Church in Malaysia, the Chinese Conference of the Methodist Church, and the Presbyterians were deeply conflicted within, with their pre-occupation about ethnic identity and their commitment to the New Village ministry. The end result was that no one noticed the shadow that passed over the land.[15]

Distressingly, the Christian leaders succumbed to Government appeasement gifts. Most leaders accepted Governmental civil titles, including the Anglican Assistant Bishop Dr. Batumalai, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop Dr Murphy Pakiam – both of whom were vehemently critical of receiving titles early in their career. No Protestant leaders refused Government grants for the repairs of their church buildings that were often mediated through the state chiefs of the non-Malay ruling alliance parties – Gerakan, MCA and MIC. None of the important Church leaders then such as the Archbishop Vendargon, Bishop Sawarimuthu or Bishop Dutton saw this as fundamentally transgressive in nature. I cannot comment on the attitudes of the present leadership but the fact remains that the Government continues to refuse to countenance the church as a partner in dialogue. In a recent invite to a tea party, 4 January 2012, the Anglican Bishop Datuk Ng Moon Heng presented the Church’s grouses to the Prime Minister – the status quo remains unchanged – cordial but rebuffed nonetheless.

Major Achievements due to Article 12 Amendment

Part of the immediate problem of the Government in 1976 was the paying of salaries of the staff of the Division of Islamic Affairs (Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam) under the Prime Minister’s Department.[16] In 1996 the Division became a Department called Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or more popularly the “Jakim”. The 1976 Constitutional amendments legalised the use of Federal funds to pay them; and embark on major Islamic projects such as the International Islamic University – a pet project of ABIM. The Government was able to regularise pay scales and benefits for Shariah Courts; subsidise or build Mosques and Suraus; establish the Pusat Islam; establish foundations such as Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam Malaysia; take over the Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR)[17]; the recruitment, training, curricular development and supply of ustaz, kadi and imam; and most importantly found the Institute Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (1992) as the regulatory body of Islamic higher education in Malaysia.

How this move by the Government, is justified in Islamic fikh is not clear but it may be legitimized as non-Muslim tax money for Islamic needs - “jizya”. However, the Islamic status of Malaysia was further affirmed, more confidently and openly, directly to the rakyat (and in a foreign forum) by the premier, Datuk Seri Najib Razak recently as a nation run on true Islamic principles. But it came with a twist that can only be understood as an enablement of Article 12. On the 5th of April 2012, the Prime Minister announced that donations and regular contributions to all religious organizations, vernacular schools, mission schools, and NGOs will become tax-exempt under the proposed Generalized Service Tax (GST) system. It is hoped that the GST will bring the majority of Malaysians into the tax regime and to radically improve the Government’s revenue. Not missing a beat, two days later[18], the Prime Minister in presenting a RM211.6 million-cheque (additional allocation to their annual budget) to the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council as a show of strength indicating that there would be more to come if the GST comes into effect and the Barisan Government wins the next election. In the same speech the Prime Minister encouraged the Muslims to embrace the middle way or wasatiyah[19].

New Directions in Christian-Muslim Relations

In the book Tipping Point [20] Malcolm Gladwell explains painstakingly how human beings in any group will continue to test the limits of permissibility, seemingly at random, that might lead to containment (if such tests are contained) or tip the social order and may set off a critical change in the character of the group. This very insight was pointed out much earlier by Dr. Mahathir in his Malay Dilemma when he likened methodical change to putting a frog in a pot of water and heating it up so slowly that it would not jump out but continue to tolerate the ever increasing heat.

The Muslims traditionally have been apprehensive of Christian evangelism, and were very much resolved as a community to resist it. And as matters stand today, not much has changed since Marmaduke first wrote his observation of Malay resilience against any proselytisation efforts by the Church.[21] This is partly may be due to the fact that Qur’an actually tells the Muslim how to deal with Christians. And to resist Christianity is an integral part of being a Muslim and their identity. Malays as a result hardly took an academic interest in Christianity. In the post-1976 era, this somewhat changed.[22] In the 1980s, the Muslims were deeply concerned by the “Charismatic Movement” and if it might cause churches to become more ecumenical and united.[23] On the other hand, the Islamic Faculty in Malayan University introduced comparative studies between Christianity and Islam. A proponent of a sociological approach in dealing with Christianity in their door-steps was the former ABIM activist Dr. Ghazali Basri. While nothing of his dark premonitions about Christianity came to be true, his approach to Christianity has been emulated by various local universities offering sociology as an academic area of enquiry into Chrstianity.

In the years since 2000, Christians and churches have moved and grown in new directions which has made the Church very visible[24], and this has proven alarming among the Muslims and the Muslim observers in the government machinery. 

Firstly, Christian population predominates in certain political constituencies, particularly in East Malaysia, where the percentage of Christian population is higher. It is therefore inevitable that concern for justice and mercy; and, economic and traditional Chinese-Bumiputra rivalry, to be translated into voter behaviour. This state of affairs fits the exact picture where a Church may be accused of mobilizing political opinions, as was the case in Sibu. How quickly this can get out of control in the news media particularly in the Malay daily Utusan Malaysia was evident, or in the news spinners of the Opposition. The refusal to accept a Government grant for the Methodist Church on the eve of the Sibu by-election on 16 May 2011 caught everyone by surprise. The Methodist Bishop Dr Hwa Yung’s deep concerns about the Church being politically involved nearly backfired.[25]

Apart from mobilizing political resources, Christians and their Churches have become adept at mobilizing huge capital resources. Some of the mega-Churches in Malaysia can and do raise capital that is unthinkable in a Malay-Muslim context where even small scale projects are always funded or subsidized by the Government. Traditional “mainline” churches often took over property acquired during the colonial period, and though foreign funds were gradually tapped off since 1957, churches have continued to accumulate assets - some well utilized some not so.[26] Over the last four decades, particularly with the rise of independent churches this power to own and utilize vast resources has come into sharper public scrutiny. I would speculate that since the Roman Catholics decided to build a church in Shah Alam in 2000[27], Islamic authorities begun an audit of Christian resources. Flashy mega projects such as the RM250 million Calvary Convention Centre or the more humble due to be built RM25 million Tamil Methodist Community Centre, it would draw concerns among the Muslims in Malaysia and may redefine relations.

Conclusion

Since 1969 the Christian-Muslim relations in Malaysia had undergone a radical change from the post-Independence era. Islamic forces, indigenous to Malay politics, accomplished the removal of the separation of state and religion by the addition of Article 12 (a) to the Constitution in 1976. With this the secular state of Malaysia died. Of course, this opinion must be contested since none of the sources that I accessed even paid a fleeting glance at Article 12. However, this in effect released the vast amount of federal financial revenue, not just the zakat, necessary for the structural changes to the government machinery, build up Islamic institutions, and set into motion policies that can be characterised as Islamization.

As far as the Christians of this generation are concerned, they have been served fait accompli an (nuanced to be sure) Islamic state to live in. This perhaps is the stage we have set for the new generation – an entire religion usurped by a government to be part of its state ideology. The Church has traditionally taken the low road in dealing with Islam as if it is just another religion and looking out for benefits and privileges from a Government to whom their members pay their taxes. Post 1976, the Church as an institution was no more dealing with another faith but a State-religion that comes with all its law and political power. The Church cannot be equal partners in any dialogue because Islam is the religious face of the state. And this perhaps explains why the Prime Minister was able to justify within Islamic fiqh the establishment of diplomatic ties with Vatican in 2011.

Politically and legally Malays are called Bumiputra, the usage of which in legislations decidedly marginalizes the non-Malays, increasingly so of each subsequent generations. All the privileges, rights and duties of Malaysians as imagined in a free and secular society has now got to be contested constantly. Christians are not only non-Bumiputra but also are ahl al-dhimma. Islam as a state ideology comples the Christians and non-Muslims to be the dhimmi, to conform to what is acceptable in Islamic jurisprudence. All the benefits of the racially motivated native-first affirmative economic policies, rightly must be treated as jizya. If such were earned unjustly, it would still be spoils of war. All these find resonance with Islamic tenets. The prospect of ever creating an even field for the economics and politics of the nation has moved a little away. And the Christian-Muslim relations in Malaysia has become a little more clarified.

Article 12(a) as an enabling law of all that is counter-current to a fair and just society, to the best of my knowledge, has never been contested. A case may be made out in hindsight that it is still acceptable as a mark of non-Muslim non-Malay generousity for the well being of the Malay community. A case may be made out that though in Islam something is haram does not mean it should be opposed by non-Muslims, such as taxation income from the gambling, pork, and alcohol industry. A case may be made out that Christians had always wished the well being of Muslims when they built schools and institutions for the welfare of all people. A case may be made out that practising Christians had served the country not only for fair wages but it was a matter of honour to do so. Such factors should prove above all that Christians are good citizens and loyal subjects of the Rulers. And Muslim intellectuals, political leaders, and the ulamaks should not begrudge non-Muslim generousity as Muslim entitlement. It is not the place for Christians to tell how Islamic jurisprudence should be but they should consider pluralism as a strength and a sure defence in the face of an ever changing fortunes of the world. We will never know what the Indian Ocean, or for that matter the South China Sea, will blow onto our shores next.

Bibliography

Abdullah Jusuh, Pengenalan Tamadun Islam di Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1990).

Cheah Book Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002)

Population and Basic Demographic Characteristics 1991, (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 1997).

Population and Basic Demographic Characteristics 2000, (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001).

Manjit S Sidhu & Gavin W Jones, Population Dynamics in a Plural Society – Peninsular Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: UMBC Publications) 1981.

Rais Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in Malaysia-A Study of Executive Supremacy, (Kuala Lumpur: Endowment Publications, 1995).

Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic thought and Civilization, 1978).

Malcolm Gladwell, Tipping Point - How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown & Co, 2000).

Ghazali Basri, Pengaruh Karismatik dalam Agama Kristian, Institute for Policy Research, Kuala Lumpur, 1996

Yap Kim Hao (ed), Islam’s Challenge for Asian Churches (Singapore: Christian Conference of Asia, 1980).

Wu Min Aun (ed), Public Law in Contemporary Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Addison Wesley Longman Malaysia, 1999).

National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report of the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1969).

Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia – Dakwah Among the Students (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987).

Journal Sources

Chandra Muzaffar, “Accommodating and Acceptance of Non-Muslim Communities within the Malaysian Political System: The Role of Islam,” The American Journal of Social Science, Vol. 13(1), 1996.

Felix V. Gagliano, Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, S. E. Asia Series No: 13) 1970.

Jerker Alf, “Islamisation in Malaysia and its Effects on the Churches,” Swedish Missiological Themes, Vol. 91(3) 2003.

Rais Yatim, “Politik dan Agenda Melayu,” Pemikir (Vo.15) Jan-Mac 1999

Theodore Gabriel, “The Malaysian Government and Christian-Muslim Relations in Malaysia,” DISKUS Vol.3, No.2 (1995).

Net Resources

http://www.islam.gov.my/

http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/133468

Tommy Thomas, “Is Malaysia an Islamic State?” Paper was delivered at the 13th Malaysian Law Conference in 2005. http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/ content/view/2066/27/ [Accessed on 11 Jan 2006]

Newspaper Source

The Sunday Star, 8 April 2001

The STAR, Saturday 5 April 2012

The STAR, Saturday 7 April 2012

Dissertations & Theses

Marmaduke Dodsworth, “The Assimilation of Christianity by the Malays of the Malay Peninsula”, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928.

Chandrasekar Pillay, “Protection of the Malay Community – UMNO Position and Opposition Attitude,” Master Thesis in Social Science (Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia) 1974.

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[1] National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy: A Report of the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1969) 29-32 gives a graphic account of the “victory parade” in Kuala Lumpur that sparked the clashes.

[2] Gagliano, Felix V. Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath, (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, S. E. Asia Series No: 13, 1970). Gagliano’s report was not accepted by the Malaysian Government as a valid reflection of the riot and was banned. His findings of facts were not very different from the Government Report.

[3] I would credit Chandrasekar Pillay, Protection of the Malay Community – UMNO Position and Opposition Attitude, Master Thesis in Social Science (Penang: Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1974) p.71 to first formulate this basic principle.

[4] Chandra Muzaffar, “Accommodating and Acceptance of Non-Muslim Communities within the Malaysian Political System: The Role of Islam,” The American Journal of Social Science, Vol. 13(1), 1996, p.32, 38

[5] Chandra Muzaffar, p.32

[6] Judith Nagata, Malaysian Mosaic: Perspectives from a Polyethnic Society (Vanvouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979) p.242

[7] Population and Basic Demographic Characteristics 1991, (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 1997) and Population and Basic Demographic Characteristics 2000, (Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2001)

[8] See also Manjit S Sidhu & Gavin W Jones, Population Dynamics in a Plural Society – Peninsular Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: UMBC Publications, 1981) p.233-260 which deals with religious composition of West Malaysians.

[9] The Merdeka Social Contract is a result of a 20-page memorandum crafted by Tunku Abdul Rahman and his advisers, and was vigorously debated in 1956 by a core group from UMNO, Tun Tan Siew Sin and his advisers in MCA, and Tun V.T. Sambanthan and his MIC advisers. For a vigorous study on the Memorandum see Tommy Thomas, “Is Malaysia an Islamic State?” Paper was delivered at the 13th Malaysian Law Conference in 2005. http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/2066/27/ [Accessed on 11 Jan 2006]

[10] Cheah Book Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002) p.161. The author makes mention of these events but makes no political link to the neglect of fundamental issues that transpired in Parliament.

[11] For the emergence of ABIM as the direct result of the changes in the educational policies of the nation see Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia – Dakwah Among the Students (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987). Note that Zainah Anwar goes on to form the Sisters in Islam. And ABIM’s role in political agitation see Senu Abdul Rahman, “ABIM dan Politik,” Risalah, July/August 1978.

[12] Rais Yatim, Freedom under Executive Power in Malaysia-A Study of Executive Supremacy, Endowment, Kuala Lumpur, 1995 was a fearsome critique of Dr Mahathir but was ameliorated by Rais Yatim, “Politik dan Agenda Melayu,” Pemikir (Vo.15) Jan-Mac 1999

[13] Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic thought and Civilization, 1978)

[14] Batumalai S., A Prophetic Christology for Neighbourology: A Theology for Prophetic Living (Kuala Lumpur: Seminari Theoloji Malaysia, 1986)

[15] Kalaimuthu, “The Chuch Union Enterprise in West Malaysia - An Anglican Perspective” (Asian Journal of Theology) 2006

[16] Formed in 1968 under the auspices of the Council of Rulers in 1968 the Secretariat was moved to the PM’s Department in 1974. This perspective was given by the Anglican Mr John Ambrose, a protocol officer in the PM’s Department. See also http://www.islam.gov.my/

[17] Indigenous Islamic schools that were gathered under the auspices of state foundations, that were eventually placed under the Ministry of Education as fully-aided schools. In 2009, Kelantan was the last state to surrender their SAR.

[18] The STAR, “No conflict with Religion” Thursday 5 April 2012; The STAR, Saturday 7 April 2012, p.6

[19] New Straits Times “Muslims Must Unite” Saturday, 7 April 2012, p.1-2

[20] Malcolm Gladwell, Tipping Point - How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown & Co, 2000)

[21] Marmaduke Dodsworth, The Assimilation of Christianity by the Malays of the Malay Peninsula, Unpublished Masters Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1928

[22] Tun Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid who took over the Economic Planning Unit as a Deputy Director in 1979, by his own private admission held a degree in Bachelor’s degree in theology from the University of London. He was later to become the Chief Government Secretary from 1990 to 1996.

[23] Ghazali Basri, Pengaruh Karismatik dalam Agama Kristian, Institute for Policy Research, Kuala Lumpur, 1996

[24] The issue of physical visibility of Churches see Ziauddin Ahmed Saheb, “The Muslim Perception of the Christian Church in Asia,” in Yap Kim Hao (ed) Islam’s Challenge for Asian Churches (Singapore: Christian Conference of Asia, 1980) p.17-30

[25] See http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/133468

[26] This disparity of asset utilization is almost denominational in character – the Roman Catholic, Methodists, Anglicans, the Lutherans have asset management peculiar to themselves.

[27] The Sunday Star, 8 April 2001.