Dhimmitude in Malaysia

Introduction

In this paper, it is asserted that the matter of al-dhimma is inseparably linked to sharia and the concept of jihad. Islamic fiqh that interpreted the rights to live under an Islamic rule of the al-dhimma with respect to their purchasing of such rights by paying a form of poll-tax called the jizya; and being a useful to the ummah – the Muslim society. Naturally in the long history of Islam there is bound to be excesses and differences that linked reprehensible customs to the exercise of collecting the jizya or interpreting the rationale of the dhimma. I do not want to be distracted by it nor do I think the Malaysian Muslim intelligentsia think it relevant. Nonetheless, the dhimmi is by default a Jew, a Christian or anyone outside this pale, has rights in an Islamic society that are conditional to the performance of certain obligations.

It is apparent from this that traditional Islamic jurisprudence has to be nuanced in its application in Malaysia. The treatment of the al-dhimma in Malaysia differs from the Middle East in essential areas: (a) the dhimmi in Malaysia includes the Hindu and the Buddhist; (b) the Malays who are almost all Muslims, do not have a significant history of racial animosity; (c) al-dhimma has a significant stake in the local economy that overt marginalization of their rights will adversely affect social stability and will put Malaysia to international odium; and (d) politically the al-dhimma represents 40.3% (as of 2010 Census) which is a significant minority of the population.

As such, it is asserted that the treatment of the al-dhimma in Malaysia is all about race-relations just as well as it is about how Muslims deal with non-Muslims. It is unlikely the Christians (and Jews, of whom there are hardly any) in Malaysia will be accorded a special status of ahl al-dhimma as understood in Western scholarship, different from other religionists. The difference is purely academic in Malaysia. As a matter of fact, Parti Sa-Islam Malaysia, the political party considered a more strident version of Islamists in Malaysia, considers the “ahli dzimmi” simply as “rakyat dan warganegar[a] yang sama tarafnya dengan rakyat dan warganegara dari golongan orang-ora[n]g lslam sendiri”.[1] This statement means that the al-dhimmi are all citizens of equal status (i.e. in terms of being citizens) as with the citizens who are Muslims, that is to say the al-dhimmi are non-Muslims irrespective of their religions.

In this paper, the treatment of the al-dhimma will be examined from the Malaysian rationale rather than from a global Islamic historic development. It does not serve well to point out all the excesses in the past, in different parts of the world, and assume the same for Malaysia. Malay Muslim jurists aside, Malaysia is a case for an on-going experiment in Islamic jurisprudence, that (a) wants all racial segments of the society to be economically robust and experiencing upward social mobility; (b) wants to be a responsible member of the international community; (c) aspires to be a dynamic and learned society - tolerant of ideas and faiths; and (d) of course, show that Islam can be a force for all that.

Dhimmitude - Supremacy of Islam

The treatment of the al-dhimma as a concept does not have an equivalent term in English it came to be called “dhimmitude”. The status of non-Muslims (particularly, the ahl-dhimmi) in an Islamic state, arising out of a systematic treatment of non-Muslims governed by Islamic jurisprudence is called “dhimmitude”. It is important to note that this very English term came into popular use only in the 1980s. It was first coined by the Lebanese Christian President Bachir Gemayel who denounced “dhimmitude” in 1982, and the term was subsequently popularized by the prolific writer Bat Ye’or. However, Bat Ye’or’s definition is perhaps more appropriate to the Levant where Islamic rule has been historically contiguous. She says “dhimmitude the comprehensive legal system established by the Muslim conquerors to rule the native non-Muslim populations subdued by jihad wars”.[2] This is not an unfair conclusion but can hardly be reflective of the mild-mannered sophistication of Malaysian politics.

It is clear that dhimmitude is an inevitable outcome of Islamic governance but its character and nature is determined by the political and economic realities of the Islamic state. Some non-Muslim thinkers may protest that dhimmitude is not an essential part of one’s personal faith and that may be true since Muslims do live in secular countries as well with no adverse effect to their faith. However, the reality is that all its social doctrine are an inseparable part of a wider political ideology which can only be called State-Islam, an entity which is characterized by two forms:

(a)  a totalitarian regime where non-Muslims possess no rights or very minimal rights. This is often achieved with the enshrinement of Islam as the state religion with citizenship made contingent upon the espousal of that religion. The religious law or the Sharia is directly implemented. An example may be likened to Saudi Arabia – an Islamic country where theocrats play a dominant role.

(b)  apartheid in character where Muslims co-exist with non-Muslims who have only a limited access to the economic and political resources of the nation. This is often achieved with the enshrinement of Islam as the official religion whereby governance is pragmatic so long as it does not contradict the Sharia.  An example is Malaysia, a Sharia-compliant country where theocrats play a less than dominant role.

In either sort of state, dhimmitude defines the privileges the non-Muslims can enjoy in the Islamic state. The privileges can take the semblance of rights so long as it coincides with what Islam can lawfully allow. 

So what does dhimmitude do for Islam? Dr. Helan Enoch Page presented a paper to the American Anthropological Association in 1993, where she defined the term “white supremacy” as an “ideological, structural and historic stratification process by which the population of European descent … has been able to intentionally sustain, to its own best advantage, the dynamic mechanics of upward or downward mobility or fluid class status over the non-European populations (on a global scale), using skin color, gender, class or ethnicity as the main criteria for allocating resources and making decisions.”[3] Dr. Page may want to confine her definition to the elucidation of the black-white relationship in the US,[4] but it possesses a deep insight into the essential nature of supremacism itself, in whatever form it may be garbed. That concept in itself is saying that certain ideological underpinnings at the cultural and social level creates a method of allocation of economic and political resources that advantages some and disadvantages others. This has been a historical constant - a truism that can be applied to different political ideologies, in different historic times, and in different geographies.

Hence, Dr. Page’s definition can be paraphrased to frame Malay supremacy as:

“The ideological, socio-structural and historical stratification process by which the population of Malay descent has gained and intentionally sustain, to its own best advantage, the dynamic mechanics of upward or downward social mobility over the non-Malay population, on a national scale, using Malay ethnicity and Islam as the main criteria for allocating resources and making political decisions.”[5]

This is not only a definition of Malay supremacy, it is also a veritable definition of dhimmitude in Malaysia.

Dhimmitude - Only a Muslim Leadership can defend Islam

The great doctrines of Islam are centred on the belief in one God (tawhid); in angels as the bearer of divine will or grace (mala’ika); in the divine Scripture (al-Qur’an) as the pivot (kutub) in the continuing revelation of God; and the prophets (nabi) and the Messenger (rasul) Muhammad as final. Muslims are also enjoined to consider the Day of Judgment (qiyama) and the hand of God in all things (qadr). In public observances a person is reckoned a Muslim if he or she declares that “there is no god but God; and Muhammad as the messenger of God” (shahada). Thereafter, an adult is required to purify himself (wudhu) and pray (salat), at best, five times a day. They are to pay the poor tax (zakat); fast (sawm) during the month of Ramadhan; and make a pilgrimage (hajj) to Makkah and worship at the Mesjid al-Haram at least once.

The encoding of the above into ordinary law is called the Sharia. The enabling law of Sharia further deals with matters of Islamic family law, apostasy, blasphemy, the criminal law (hudud dealing with sariqa, haraba, zina, qadhf, sukr, and irtidad) and it takes into cognizance the specific rights and duties of non-Muslims, the ahl al-dhimmi, that are allowable in Islamic jurisprudence.

And finally Muslims are required to strive (jihad) against their base nature to keep the faith (jihad akhbar). Muslims are also exhorted at all times to protect their way of life, and this is called jihad asgar or the lesser jihad. Of course, some ideologues extend their interpretation (fiqh) to demand the destruction of the enemies of Islam…this sort of jihad is really a third type where subterfuge, terrorism and assassination are acceptable instruments of the struggle. Often Muslim scholars do not distinguish this radical definition of jihad and jihad asgar but they are really two very different positions arising legitimately from the general corpus of Islamic thought.

It is clear from this that the non-Muslim cannot be expected to be of one mind with Muslims when it comes to protecting the Islamic way of life or keeping the sharia. It is not possible for non-Muslims to be exemplary in the public observances of Islam, as a result it is a cardinal rule that in Islam there can be no non-Muslim leaders, which can mean that non-Muslim cabinet ministers is not an acceptable situation in an Islamic state.[6]

It is not difficult to see that the political aspect of Islam creates a condition where Christians and Muslims have equal share to the common space of nation and land (such as in Jordan and Syria); or where a predominantly Islamic population in plural societies have set up democratic governments (such as in Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia), to negotiate and define the Muslim-non-Muslim relationship. Malaysia however, poses a unique situation in the history of Christian-Muslim relations. The Malays who form the dominant racial group in Malaysia are almost entirely Muslims, and this makes the issues of religious relation also uniquely a matter of race relations.

Enabling Dhimmitude - Article 12(a) of the Federal Constitution
This little argued Article of the Constitution is foundation of the Malaysian brand of Islamic state. It states:

“The Constitution is hereby amended by substituting for Clause (2) of Article 12 the following new Clause (2): "(2) Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such institutions or in the administration of any such law; but it shall be lawful for the Federation or a State to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instruction in the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the purpose.”

The emphasis is mine to show that it is this piece of legislation that allowed the vast Federal Revenue to be used for the benefit of the Islam – the “official religion” of the nation. Article 12(a) of the Constitution[7], as such is an enabling legislation for the State to function as an Islamic state – 27th August is the day secularism in Malaysia was put to the drips.

However, Malaysia is not a theocratic nation, but nonetheless, a nation ruled by Muslims, and its laws are in accordance with Islamic fiqh or being continuously revised according to Islamic fiqh. For this reason some scholars have termed Malaysia as a “quasi-secular democratic state”[8] and that is a way of saying “quasi-Islamic state” democratic or otherwise. The un-Islamic aspects of the law is tolerated so long as it constantly challenged Malaysia is “becoming Islamic”.

Impediments to Dhimmitude

In this manner, Malaysia has side-stepped some of the pitfalls of other Islamic nations where jihad means the destruction of its enemies; being anti-American; or being anti-Semitic or for that matter even getting involved in the Middle East politics. Malaysia, however in deference to international Islamic opinion, has no diplomatic relations with Israel. One must keep in mind that the rudimentary anti-Israeli ideology in Malaysia is not a product of its own history or domestic politics. The goal of Malaysian polity does not seem to be an Islamic totalitarianism or concentration of executive power that seems to be characteristics of many nations but an Islamic ideology governed by its commitment to capitalism and to a form of democracy that has the participation of the non-Muslims. However, Islamic fiqh in Malaysia, as elsewhere would tend towards not just an effective Islamic supremacy but also a symbolic supremacy of it as well. And there are two impediments laid out before the march of Islamization:

a.     Malaysia is a plural society - 64.4% of Malaysians are Malays or Bumiputras; the Chinese make up 25.7%; and the Indians 7.5%. Malaysian Muslims make up 59.6%; Christians 8.9%; Hindus 6.5%; and Chinese Religionists 22.6%. Islam in whatever form it should take, the politics of which comes into direct collision with the politics of a pluralistic nation.[9] Each of the racial groups espouses a particular religion predominantly, and in the overlapping areas there are minorities whose interests are also precarious.

The non-Muslims are enjoined by public policy to be good citizens, share in the wealth of the nation, work hard, and live harmoniously. The cultural comfort of the non-Muslims is evident in the food culture and holiday mania of the average Malaysian. A “solution”[10] to correct these figures favourably for the Islamists would be to introduce economic shocks in the system that would encourage migration or assimilation.[11] The flip-flop in the implementation of the PPSMI[12] policy in the Ministry of Education; or the use of Interlok[13] as part of Malay literature in secondary schools could be interpreted in this way. It sends a message to the community to deprive them of any faith in a stable education system, and so discourage the development of any non-Malay political entrenchment.

However, the problems on the economic side of Malaysian life is more complicated. The non-Muslim share of the economic pie is strong and there are many policies set up by the Government that are unfavourable to them in terms of gaining Governmental contracts, licenses, and access to capital. This is discussed elsewhere. And yet the thriving non-Muslim economy suggests that the Malay-first or Muslim-first policies are not yet a destabilizing impediment, it is a thumbs-up for the people in policy planning to continue the unfavourable terms in Malaysian commerce.

b.     The Rulers as the guardians of Islam - The symbolism of state Islam has been traditionally vested with the Rulers. Although there is a supreme ruler elected once in five years to be the Agung, the jurisdiction of Islam remains with the Rulers in their own state. This has led to an uncertainty with respect to the Constitutional rule of law. Almost all the various states have gone on to legislate Sharia that are ultra vires the Federal Constitution. Dr. Shad Saleem Faruqi, a much respected Islamic Constitutional lawyer, thinks the “federal-state division of legislative power has broken down in relation to matters of Islamic law”.[14] He in fact calls it “talibanisation”, and it is happening right under the nose of the Rulers. The backlash to this can be counter-productive to Islamization or may accelerate the process, but presently it is a mess that does not commend itself to say that Islam has achieved a symbolic supremacy.

Intrinsic Ethics of Dhimmitude in Malaysia

Parliamentary Bills and Government bureaucratic policies are vetted by the Economic Planning Unit to determine if they are against Bumiputra commercial interest, but also by the Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia to determine if it conforms to Islamic jurisprudence. As a result it would not be unfair to see certain anomalies in governance as a result of attitudes of the Government towards non-Muslims as dhimmi.

a.     Article 121(1A) of the Federal Constitutional 1988 Amendment
Article 121(1A) which says “The courts (i.e. the High Courts) referred to in clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Sharia.”[15] The intention behind this Constitutional amendment was to elevate the Sharia Court to that of the High Court but since both these courts are courts of first instance in many cases.

Problems arose almost immediately. The issue of conversion are now determined at the Sharia Court and is not subject to further review at the High Court. Problems arise when the plaintiff is not a Muslim and expects standards of non-Islamic jurisprudence to be applied to them; or when access to justice itself is cut off for the non-Muslims who do not have the right of audience at the Sharia Courts; or when secular Courts abdicate their authority to judge on issues that are not necessarily Islamic (i.e. the right to profess one’s religion or apostatize) when it appears contiguous to issues that are necessarily within the competence of the Sharia Courts (i.e. the matter of evidence as to one’s profession of Islam or apostatize thereof). While this may summarize the problem created by the famous Moorthy’s Case[16] and case of Lina Joy[17], there are other problems left unresolved in the air, namely evidence produced by non-Muslims; a will declaring an unregistered apostasy; rights to the pension of a converted spouse; rights to the custody of young children; rights of the non-Muslim parent to determine the religion of their young children; detention of apostates upon registration; and most stinging - the automatic nullification of the marriage upon the conversion of one spouse to Islam.

The accumulation of inadvertent application of Islamic law upon non-Muslims cannot be unforeseen and it is not acceptable. It could be resolved by the courage and diligence of the learned judges to say that rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities acquired in secular law ought to be satisfied and exhausted in secular law; and the Sharia Court will not limit, deprive, or modify such rights, privileges, duties and responsibilities even if the litigant has converted to Islam. Adjudicating to allow such injustices resulting from Article 121(1A) should be properly called an expression of dhimmitude.

b.     Use of Haram Income for Islamic Development
Non-Muslims are also tax-payers in the country, and by virtue of Article 12(2), the revenue of the nation is spent on supporting and developing Islamic institutions. This does not take into account if this money comes from taxation of businesses forbidden (haram) in the eyes Islam such as Magnum Corporation Sdn Bhd, Genting Berhad, Guiness Anchor Berhad or Carlsberg Malaysia. Unfortunately, a sizeable portion of the economy is dependent on gambling; alcohol; the pork industry; and tobacco. Such revenue should be haram too but the utilization of such revenue for Islamic affairs is often considered duplicitous on the part of the Government but it could be considered a form of jizya, but it is considered legitimate (halal) in the eyes of Islam? And the injustice is particularly stinging since the state funds allocated for religious purposes go disproportionately to the development of Islamic institutions.

Although Malaysia portrays itself in the forefront of Islamic banking, it has not done anything to what is called “unsecured business activities” which as the name suggests are business with no collateral such as the credit cards. In factoring the loss of income due to defaulters into the interest rates of the servicing debtors, the interest rates run into huge indecent percentages of 30-40% per year. In a sense, this sort of usurious business is unIslamic and should be correctly haram. But the revenue is large enough and banks that purportedly practice Islamic principles benefit from it even Banks that are owned by Muslims. Such business if it benefits the banks (especially owned by Muslims), is properly spoils and therefore a form of jizya.

c.     Church and Freedom of Religion

There is a tendency for Christians and Churches to see their relationship with the Government and dealing with the Islamic elements within it as the only source of their problem. While the Anglican Church[18]; the Roman Catholics and their related Orders[19]; the Methodists[20]; and certain missionary organizations[21] are incorporated by Acts of Parliament, some Presbyterians are gazetted in State enactments[22]; and the rest (including the Seminary Theoloji Malaysia) are registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs as Societies formed for religious purposes. The Government does not afford them any sort of privileged treatment, nor are their theologians participants in any forum where Islam is a part thereof. It is of course not any fault of the Church; it is just disdained by Islamic public opinion.

Under the newly proposed Generalized Service Tax system, all public (Christians included) contribution – donations and subscriptions, to mission school, vernacular school, bona-fide NGOs, churches, and temples are tax rebatable. Accepting these sorts of privileges can also be justified by the working of Article 12(a) of the Constitution. It is also easy to see that church leaders often accept candy civil titles conferred by the Malay Rulers who are state guardians of the Islamic faith. Could this not be interpreted as the Church leadership affirming dhimmitude?

Conclusion

One of the Qura’nic injunctions in dealing with ahl al-dhimmi is to exploit them if they benefit the ummah. In the present era, the al-dhimma is strong economically and politically but the status quo suggests that the non-Muslims have purchased that right to live here but this is not a historic constant. Dhimmitude exists in Malaysia, and as a result certain aspects of Islamic law is imposed upon the al-dhimmi; certain parts of the Government is not accessible to them; and the State exact far more than the jizya in the legal and palatable form of tax but the benefits are disproportionately utilized by a large margin in favour of Muslims only. The Malaysian al-dhimmi has been generous and magnanimous, but that is because so far no obligatory taxation couched in religious terms has ever been imposed upon them – it is invisible. The non-Muslims fulminate about how unfair the state of affairs is not realizing that jizya is spoils of war, and need not be halal in the first place.

Nonetheless, given the Malay/Muslim politics of the nation, the violation of justice arising from dhimmitude cannot improve. The polarization of citizens in Malaysia that is commonly felt in work places, schools and public areas are often argued in the media and attributed to nascent racism that needs to be kept in check. But this is also about religion – a polarization arising from dhimmitude. The erosion of the rights of ahl al-dhimmi in an Islamic state, however one wants to interpret it, cannot end in a nice way. Any state ideology has a life of its own - foisted, defended, and perpetuated by an elite segment who benefits by it, and such an elite uses all the intellectual, religious, political, economic, and security resources of the nation to achieve that status quo. This is not easily dismantled but history teaches us that nothing is inexhaustible.

What is different in Malaysia is that racism is talked about openly, albeit by calling it “communalism”. It is an ambivalent word that can mean racism if used sociologically, but has a positive note in describing the political arrangement of the ruling alliance. What Malaysians do not talk about is that behind the political communalism or social racism, there also lies silently dhimmitude. Silence is its strength. The Malay leadership hopes to perfect an Islamic nationhood without overt use of coercion, or getting into a needless hurry, but progressively allocating economic and political resources for themselves that are patently unjust to the non-Muslims/non-Malays. And very often they point out economic and historic reasons to justify it. One can only imagine how unjust policies can be sustained within the framework of the Malay religious and moral culture which happens to be almost wholly inspired by the Islamic world. Examination of such morality allows one to pull out of this edifice of Islamic justice the religiously sanctioned ethics of dhimmitude. What is pertinent to the Christian is not so much as examining its ethical correctness, but in contesting it give it visibility.

Bibliography

Abdullah Hussain, Interlok (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1971).

Andre Brink, A Fork in the Road, (London: Harvill Secker, 2009) – Available at http://www.bookdrum.com/books/a-fork-in-the-road/9781846552441/-bookmarks-101-125.html [Accessed 23 July 2011].

Chip Berlet, Eyes right!: Challenging the Right Wing Backlash, (Somerville, Montana: Political Research Associates, 1995).

Harun Taib (Haji YB) (ed), Negara Islam - Mimbar Ulama, Dewan Ulama Pas Pusat, (Kuala Lumpur: Pejabat Agung Pas, ud).

Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine – The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008).

Paul Monash, Malay Supremacy (Auckland: Maygen Press, 2003).

Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 2001)

Wan Hashim, Race Relations in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Heinemann, 1983)

 

Journal and Seminar Papers

Bat Ye'or, “Dhimmitude Past and Present:An Invented or Real History?” Paper presented at Brown University C.V. Starr Foundation Lectureship on 10th October 2002 available at http://www.dhimmitude.org /archive/by_lecture_ 10oct2002.htm [Accessed 31 January 2012].

Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Muslims Reclaiming the Quasi-Secular Democratic State” Paper presented at the symposium ‘Spirited Voices from the Muslim World’ on 27-29 April 2011 at the University of Sydney. Available at http://rp-www.arts.usyd.edu.au/ government_international_relations /downloads/documents/ spirited_voices/Lily_Rahim_Muslims_ %20Reclaiming_the_Quasi-Secular_Democratic_State.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2012].

Shad Saleem Faruqi, “Jurisdiction of State Authorities to punish offences against the precepts of Islam: A Constitutional Perspective” http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/constitutional_law/jurisdiction_of_state_ authorities_to_punish_offences_against_the_precepts_of_islam_a_constitutional_perspective.html [Access: 12 April 2012]

Zainur Zakaria, “Article 121(1A),” INSAF – Journal of the Malaysian Bar, Vol.36(No.1) 2007

Internet Sources

http://www.rootsie.com/forum/index.php? topic=1229.0 [Accessed: 1 April 2012] Dr. Helan Enoch Page, “Definition of Racism”

Cases Quoted

Kaliammal a/p Sinnasamy v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Jawi) & 2 Yg lain (2006) 1 AMR 498

Lina Joy @ Azalina Jailani v Majlis Agama Wilayah Persekutuan & 2 Lagi (2005) 5 AMR 663

Legislations Mentioned

Synod of the Diocese of West Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1972 (Act 36) (Amendment 1997).

Roman Catholic Bishops (Incorporation) Act 1957 (Act 492) (Revised 1992).

Visitor of the Christian Brother’s School (Incorporation) Ordinance 1954.

Lady Superior of the Society of the Saint Maur (Incorporation) Ordinance 1955.

Titular Superior of the Brothers of Saint Gabriel (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957.

Daughters of Charity of the Canossian Institute (Incorporation) Ordinance of 1957.

Superior of the Institute of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957.

Titular Superior of the Institute of the Marist Brothers of the Schools (Incorporation) Ordinance 1958; Redemptorist Fathers (Incorporation) Act 1962.

Superior of the Institute of the Congregation of the Brothers of Mercy (Incorporation) Act 1972 (Act 86).

Good Shepherd Nuns (Incorporation) Act 1973 (Act 108).

Methodist Church in Malaysia Act 1955 (Act 457) (Revised 1991).

Salvation Army (Incorporation) Ordinance 1956.

Overseas Missionary Fellowship (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957.

Sarawak (Reprint 1967) Cap. 106 (Am: Swk. Ord. 7/77, LN. 4/78, Ord. 7/82, 5/88, LN. 45/88).

Treasurer of the St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church, Selangor (Incorporation) En. 9/1937.

Treasurer of the St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church, Perak (Incorporation) En. 4/1940; Presbyterian Church, Penang, S.S. Cap. 254 (Am: FLN. 298/59).

Presbyterian Church of England Mission Incorporation – Johore En. 139.

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[1] Ahmad Ali (Ustaz YB), “Kedud[u]kan Orang Bukan Islam Dalam Negara Islam” in Harun Taib (Haji YB) (ed), Negara Islam - Mimbar Ulama, Dewan Ulama Pas Pusat, (Kuala Lumpur: Pejabat Agung Pas, ud) 20 (up)

[2] Bat Ye'or, “Dhimmitude Past and Present :An Invented or Real History?” Paper presented at Brown University C.V. Starr Foundation Lectureship on 10th October 2002http://www.dhimmitude.org /archive/by_lecture_10oct2002.htm [Accessed 31 January 2012]

[3] Loretta Ross, “White Supremacy in the 1990s” in Chip Berlet, Eyes right!: Challenging the Right Wing Backlash, (Somerville, Montana: Political Research Associates, 1995) 172-173

[4] Dr. Helan Enoch Page, “Definition of Racism” http://www.rootsie.com/forum/index.php? topic=1229.0 [Accessed: 1 April 2012]

[5] This paraphrase first appeared in Paul Monash, Malay Supremacy (Auckland: Maygen Press, 2003) ix

[6] Abu Anif (Ustaz YB), “Al Sultah Al Tanfiziyyah Dalam Negara Islam: Kedudukan Bukan Islam” in Harun Taib (Haji YB) (ed), Negara Islam - Mimbar Ulama, Dewan Ulama Pas Pusat, (Kuala Lumpur: Pejabat Agung Pas, ud) 20 (up)

[7] Laws of Malaysia (Act A354) Constitution (Amendment) Act 1976, Date of coming into operation 27th August 1976.

[8]Lily Zubaidah Rahim, “Muslims Reclaiming the Quasi-Secular Democratic State” Paper presented at the symposium ‘Spirited Voices from the Muslim World’ on 27-29 April 2011 at the University of Sydney. http://rp-www.arts.usyd.edu.au/government_international_relations/downloads/documents/spirited_voices/Lily_Rahim_Muslims_%20Reclaiming_the_Quasi-Secular_Democratic_State.pdf [Accessed 13 April 2012] Although published in Australia this author is taken seriously by Malaysian thinkers. In fact her use of the term wasatiya to mean moderation was reflected by our Premier in recent public speeches.

[9] Table 3.2 of the Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printers, 2001)

[10] The word “solution” as in “solution to the problem of ethnic pluralism” was first used in Malaysia by the UKM professor Wan Hashim in his Race Relations in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Heinemann, 1983) 109 a term he had admiringly borrowed from Nazi literature.

[11] For extreme instances of this methodology in social engineering please see Naomi Klein’s devastating analysis of Milton Friedman’s economic policies in The Shock Doctrine – The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008)

[12] The Bahasa Melayu abbreviation for “Pengajaran dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik Dalam Bahasa Inggeris” or “The Teaching and Learning of Science and Mathematics in English”.

[13] Abdullah Hussain, Interlok (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1971). This is a fine book to explore Malay racial prejudices and social stereotypes, but whether it can do justice in the national school system that does not command public confidence became the underlying issue especially in its official “purified” version. The book was withdrawn from most states.

[14] Shad Saleem Faruqi, “Jurisdiction of State Authorities to punish offences against the precepts of Islam: A Constitutional Perspective” http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/constitutional_law/ jurisdiction_of_state_authorities_to_punish_offences_against_the_precepts_of_islam_a_constitutional_perspective.html [Access:12 April 2012]

[15] Zainur Zakaria, “Article 121(1A),” INSAF – Journal of the Malaysian Bar, Vol.36(No.1) 2007, 29-54

[16] Kaliammal a/p Sinnasamy v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (Jawi) & 2 Yg lain (2006) 1 AMR 498

[17] Lina Joy @ Azalina Jailani v Majlis Agama Wilayah Persekutuan & 2 Lagi (2005) 5 AMR 663

[18] Synod of the Diocese of West Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1972 (Act 36) (Amendment 1997)

[19] Roman Catholic Bishops (Incorporation) Act 1957 (Act 492) (Revised 1992); Visitor of the Christian Brother’s School (Incorporation) Ordinance 1954; Lady Superior of the Society of the Saint Maur (Incorporation) Ordinance 1955; Titular Superior of the Brothers of Saint Gabriel (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957; Daughters of Charity of the Canossian Institute (Incorporation) Ordinance of 1957; Superior of the Institute of the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957; Titular Superior of the Institute of the Marist Brothers of the Schools (Incorporation) Ordinance 1958; Redemptorist Fathers (Incorporation) Act 1962; Superior of the Institute of the Congregation of the Brothers of Mercy (Incorporation) Act 1972 (Act 86); and Good Shepherd Nuns (Incorporation) Act 1973 (Act 108).

[20] Methodist Church in Malaysia Act 1955 (Act 457) (Revised 1991).

[21] Salvation Army (Incorporation) Ordinance 1956; Overseas Missionary Fellowship (Incorporation) Ordinance 1957; and Missionary Societies – Sarawak (Reprint 1967) Cap. 106 (Am: Swk. Ord. 7/77, LN. 4/78, Ord. 7/82, 5/88, LN. 45/88).

[22] Treasurer of the St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church, Selangor (Incorporation) En. 9/1937; Treasurer of the St. Andrew’s Presbyterian Church, Perak (Incorporation) En. 4/1940; Presbyterian Church, Penang, S.S. Cap. 254 (Am: FLN. 298/59); and Presbyterian Church of England Mission Incorporation – Johore En. 139.